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263 
STRENGTHENING SECTION 14141: USING PATTERN OR 
PRACTICE INVESTIGATIONS TO END VIOLENCE 
BETWEEN POLICE AND COMMUNITIES 
 
“Why is it that officers are not responsible for their acts 
when other citizens are?”1 
 




Imagine you are on your way home from work and driving your 
usual route.  You hear police sirens getting louder and louder.  You 
realize you are the subject of their chase, but you cannot imagine 
why.  You slow down and pull over, not wanting to cause 
confrontation.  The officer beats on your car door.  You roll down 
your window and ask why you have been pulled over.  The officer 
informs you that your tail light is broken.  Next, the officer orders 
you out of the car.  Your heart races as the officer pats you 
down.  You wonder if the officer knows you are in arrears for child 
support, a punishable offense in South Carolina.2  You hope for a 
chance to explain your situation. 
You ask the officer why you needed to leave the vehicle.  Rather 
than offer a verbal explanation, the officer draws a weapon.  
Gripping his weapon, the officer tries to pin you down and 
handcuff you.  You know you haven’t done anything worth going 
to jail over, so you resist!  You feel like you have fought him off, 
but suddenly you feel a sharp burn of a taser shot.  Unsure of what 
the officer will do next, you grab the device that injured you and 
throw it to the ground.  Now is your chance to break away!  You 
run, unarmed.  Dashing for your life, you get about fifteen feet 
 
1 Associated Press, Cincinnati Officer is Acquitted in Killing That Ignited Unrest, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 27, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/27/us/cincinnati-officer-is-
acquitted-in-killing-that-ignited-unrest.html (quoting the mother of Timothy Thomas, an 
unarmed black teenager shot and killed by a Cleveland police officer). 
2 See Child Support, S.C. BAR, https://www.scbar.org/public/get-legal-help/common-
legal-topics/child-support/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2019).  
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away.  Suddenly, you feel indescribably painful blows to your 
spine.  The officer fires repeated gun shots when you were 
seventeen feet ahead, unarmed and back turned away.  You swiftly 
fall to the ground, only this time never to wake up again.  The 
officer places the taser near your lifeless body, and walks away.  
These are Walter Scott’s last moments on earth.  Scott, an 
unarmed black man, died by eight consecutive gunshots fired at 
his back by a white police officer.3  This violent arrest would not 
have receive attention but for a home video taken by a bystander.4  
When questioned, the police officer explained that his gunfire was 
a reaction of “total fear.”5  Conversely, video footage shows Scott 
did not pose a deadly threat.6  The footage also reveals the officer 
placing the taser next to Scott’s lifeless body, perhaps attempting 
to skew the evidence.7  
Scott’s death echoes the loss of Michael Brown, an unarmed 
black teenager who died by lethal excessive use of force in 2014, in 
Ferguson, Missouri.8  Although some evidence suggests Mr. Brown 
put his hands up offering a truce as the officer closed in on him, 
the officer proceeded to fire twelve rounds at the teenager.9  That 
same year, Mr. Garner, an unarmed black man, was approached 
by a group of policemen for the petty violation of selling loose 
cigarettes.10  A “swarm” of police officers surrounded him while 
one put him in a choke hold.11  Garner died gasping for air and 
 
3 Michael S. Schmidt & Matt Apuzzo, South Carolina Officer is Charged With Murder 
of Walter Scott, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/08/us/south-
carolina-officer-is-charged-with-murder-in-black-mans-death.html.  
4 See Alan Blinder, Michael Slager, Officer in Walter Scott Shooting, Gets 20-Year 
Sentence, N.Y. Times (Dec. 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/07/us/michael-
slager-sentence-walter-scott.html?_r=0.   
5 Id. 
6 See id. 
7 Id. 
8 See Larry Buchanan et al., What Happened in Ferguson?, N.Y. TIMES (last updated 
Aug. 10, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/08/13/us/ferguson-missouri-
town-under-siege-after-police-shooting.html. 
9 See id. 
10 See Al Baker et al., Beyond the Chokehold: The Path to Eric Garner’s Death, N.Y. 
Times (June 13, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/14/nyregion/eric-garner-police-
chokehold-staten- island.html. 
11 See Joseph Goldstein & Nate Schweber, Man’s Death After Chokehold Raises Old 
Issue for the Police, N.Y. TIMES (July 18, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/19/nyregion/staten-island-man-dies-after-he-is-put-in-
chokehold-during-arrest.html?smid=pl-share. 
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crying, “I can’t breathe.”12  In 2016, Philando Castile, a father and 
husband, died by five police gunshots as he peacefully reached for 
his license and registration, his girlfriend and daughter in the 
vehicle witnessing the violence.13  Then, on March 18, 2018, two 
officers who did not identify themselves as law enforcement 
approached Stephon Clark in his grandmother’s backyard and 
shouted for Clark to come forth.14  Suspecting his involvement in 
a recent crime, the officers asked Clark to reveal his hands.15  The 
officers shot Clark repeatedly before he could show himself to be 
unarmed.16  When officers approached Clark’s body, they found 
that he was in fact unarmed.17  Again, on June 19, 2018, 
seventeen-year-old honors student Antwon Rose was shot three 
times as he ran away from a traffic stop.18  These accounts capture 
a glimpse of the staggering amount of annual police homicides of 
civilians.19 
Communities of color and their allies are responding to these 
incidents of violence through activist organizations including, but 
not limited to, the Black Lives Matter (“BLM”) movement.20  
Vocalizing citizen support for heightened accountability of 
American police forces through groups like BLM is critical because 
the movement brings national awareness to persistent, systemic 
racialized violence against people of color.21  However, awareness 
 
12 Baker et al., supra note 10.  
13 See Matt Furber & Richard Pérez-Peña, After Philando Castile’s Killing, Obama 
Calls Police Shootings ‘an American Issue’, N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/08/us/philando-castile-falcon-heights- shooting.html. 
14 See Jamiles Lartey, Stephon Clark family joins hundreds in Sacramento for fifth 
day of protest, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 1, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2018/mar/31/stephon-clark-hundreds-condemn-police-killing-in-fourth-night-of-
protest. 
15 See id. 
16 See id. 
17 See id. 
18 Melissa Gomez, Antwon Rose, Killed by a Police Office, Is Remembered at Funeral 
as a ‘Bright Light’, N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/25/us/antwon-rose-funeral-pittsburgh-police.html. 
19 See Jon Swaine & Ciara McCarthy, Killings by US police logged at twice the 
previous rate under new federal program, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 15, 2016), 
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/dec/15/us-police-killings-department-of-
justice-program (explaining that a Guardian study documented 1,146 civilian homicides 
perpetrated by police in 2015). 
20 See What We Believe, BLACK LiVES MATTER, 
https://blacklivesmatter.com/about/what-we-believe/. 
21 See id. 
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does not change the system without a corresponding change in our 
laws.22  Using 42 U.S.C. § 14141, we can ground activism in a 
change in our legal structure.  Through § 14141’s uniquely legal 
response to police brutality, we can enforce peaceable arrest 
practices across our Nation’s cities.  Section 14141’s power to 
create change is grounded in its basis on evidence, strong judicial 
processes, and power to enjoin police departments to specific terms 
and particularized outcomes designed on a city by city basis. 
This note argues that 42 U.S.C. § 14141 is a critical pillar of civil 
rights legislation because it creates specific accountability for 
police institutions which cannot be provided through advocacy 
groups alone.  Likewise, § 14141 requires municipal adherence to 
reforms, thereby addressing unconstitutional policing at a local 
level—a task which is impossible under the framework of other 
existing civil rights laws.23   
Although § 14141 fills a critical gap in civil rights legislation, it 
is not without flaws.24  For example, § 14141 is a strong change-
maker when the federal government is actively surveilling local 
police departments.25  Cities under active surveillance see police-
to-civilian violence decrease and community-to-police 
communication increase.26  However, we find inconsistent 
outcomes in reform for the years and decades following § 14141 
when, after cities prove their adherence to reform, leading the 
federal government to ceases its oversight as the federal 
government is convinced of the reform’s soundness.27  This note 
responds to § 14141’s inconsistent long-term effectiveness by first 
evaluating causes of discrepancies in enduring reform adherence 
between different police departments formerly under federal 
review.  Second, this note will demonstrate that grounding reform 
on specific political leaders undermines long-term reform.  
Conversely, grounding reform in local groups representing both 
 
22 See id. 
23 See Rachel A. Harmon, Promoting Civil Rights Through Proactive Policing Reform, 
62 STAN. L. REV. 1, 3, 4, 7, 20 (2009). 
24 See A ‘Pattern or Practice’ of Violence in America, BLOOMBERG (May 27, 2015), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2015-doj-and-police-violence/. 
25 See id. 
26 See id. 
27 See Kimbriell Kelly et al., What Happens When Police Are Forced to Reform?, 
FRONTLINE (Nov. 13, 2015), https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/what-happens-
when-police-are-forced-to-reform/. 
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police and city residents strengthens the capacity for enduring 
change.  Thus, ultimately this note proposes that the most 
effective mechanism to ensure long-term reform under 42 U.S.C. § 
14141 is amending the statute to legally empower local citizen 
groups within the reform process. 
Section I explores the history of civil rights actions against police 
and police institutions before 42 U.S.C. § 14141 by highlighting 
the problematic reliance on Reconstruction Era statutes.  It then 
explores how the expansion of citizen causes of action allowed for 
recovery against individual police officers, but still indemnified 
police departments.  Section II discusses the impetus behind the 
creation of 42 U.S.C. § 14141.  It then explains the legal steps 
necessary to bring about federal oversight under 42 U.S.C. § 14141 
and the practical application of changes proposed by the 
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) to departments under federal 
review. 
Section III evaluates the varying results of § 14141 and studies 
in detail the best practices from major cities, such as Pittsburgh, 
Los Angeles, and Cincinnati.  This note seeks to understand why 
these practices created lasting, improved relations between police 
and their communities and relies on DOJ filings, regional crime 
data, and scholarly case studies. 
Section IV proposes amending 42 U.S.C. § 14141, such that its 
legal mechanism incorporates the strategies which have had the 
most success since the Act’s enactment in 1994.  Section IV 
proposes Congress create a legal mechanism empowering 
community groups to act as oversight bodies during federal 
oversight.  Building the legal role of these institutions creates a 
system of accountability that can outlast the length of a federal 
oversight period.  Moreover, by involving the community in 
designing local reforms, the process will be driven by long-
standing groups whose investment in the process will support 
change lasting longer than shifts in local political leadership.  
Most importantly, legally empowering community groups in 
partnership with the DOJ  will overcome police department 
resistance to changes more effectively than the threat of further 
DOJ action alone. 
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I. HISTORY OF CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS AGAINST POLICE AND 
POLICE INSTITUTIONS 
 
Before 42 U.S.C. § 14141, 42 U.S.C § 1983 and the Fourteenth 
Amendment created a civil cause of action for citizens that 
providing monetary damages in instances of police brutality.28  
This legal framework for protecting citizens against excessive use 
of force by police is the same framework enacted one hundred 
twenty-three years earlier to protect newly freed slaves from 
violent pro-confederate groups.29  During the southern 
reconstruction from 1863-1877, the Ku Klux Klan whipped and 
murdered blacks who tried to exercise their newly granted right to 
vote.30  The Antebellum Republican Congress drafted the Ku Klux 
Klan Act to provide immediate relief from the violent, 
discriminatory attacks.31  One section of this legislation became 
the current text for 42 U.S.C. § 1983,32 which reads: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, 
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the 
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any 
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction 
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities 
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party 
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper 
proceeding for redress . . . .33  
Though originally created for the unique setting of the post-Civil 
War south, this legislation later provided a civil cause of action for 





28 See Matthew J. Silveira, An Unexpected Application of 42 U.S.C. § 14141: Using 
Investigative Findings for § 1983 Litigation, 52 UCLA L. REV. 601, 606, 608 (2004).  
29 See id. at 607, n. 20. “Congress passed § 1983 as part of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 
1871 at the tail-end of ‘[a] wave of federal civil rights legislation.’” Id. 
30 See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: CIVIL RIGHTS 
– PART I 443 (Chelsea House Publishers, 1970).  
31 See David Achtenberg, A “Milder Measure of Villainy”: The Unknown History of 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 and the Meaning of “Under Color of” Law, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 1, 7 (1999). 
32 Id. at 2.  
33 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018) (emphasis added). 
34 See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171-72 (1961). 
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A. Limitations Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
 
For almost a century, from the Antebellum Era of the late 1860s 
to the civil rights movement of the 1960s, a private citizen 
succeeding on a § 1983 claim under the Fourteenth Amendment 
against police departments proved practically impossible.35  
Instead, plaintiffs relied on the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to seek relief for police misconduct, which 
proclaims no state shall “deny to any person within its jurisdiction 
equal protection of the laws.”36  This language means states must 
apply the laws to each of its citizens in the same manner.37  When 
bringing a Fourteenth Amendment claim against a state actor, 
which includes a police department, victims’ claims are required 
to fall under one of two complaints: (1) the department used an 
explicit race-based classification policy38; or (2) the department 
used a policy that is “impartial in appearance” but applied 
discriminatorily against a group.39 
Applying the first cause of action to police misconduct was rarely 
successful because explicit race-based policies became almost 
unheard of in policy-making.40  Likewise, proving that a police 
department acted in a consciously discriminatory manner is an 
evidentiary barrier for private litigants.41  Thus, the second 
approach is only marginally easier to succeed on in court.   
Monroe v. Pape changed the landscape for claims against police 
departments by changing the interpretation of the phrase “color 
 
35 See Michael S. Vaughn & Lisa F. Coomes, Police Civil Liability Under Section 1983: 
When Do Police Officers Act Under Color of Law?, 23 J. CRIM. JUST. 395, 396-97 (1995). 
36 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
37 See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985).  
38 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (explaining that “[t]he central 
purpose of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is the prevention of 
official conduct [which includes police officers] discriminating on the basis of race . . . But 
our cases have not embraced the proposition that a law or other official act, without regard 
to whether it reflects a racially discriminatory purpose, is unconstitutional Solely because 
it has a racially disproportionate impact.”).  
39 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373 (1886) (“Though the law itself be fair on its 
face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it is applied and administered by public authority 
with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal 
discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the 
denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the Constitution.”). 
40 See Report to the United Nations on Racial Disparities in the U.S. Criminal Justice 
System, SENTENCING PROJECT (Apr. 19, 2018), 
https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/un-report-on-racial-disparities/. 
41 See Harmon, supra note 23, at 9. 
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of” law in the text of 42 U.S. C. § 1983 from being limited to strictly 
private actors, such as Ku Klux Klan members, to including 
institutional actors such as police officers and their supervising 
departments.42  The Supreme Court found that the Antebellum 
Congress created the initial Ku Klux Klan Act to properly enforce 
the Fourteenth Amendment.43  Thus, this same language in the 
descendant statute, namely 42 U.S.C. § 1983, is intended to 
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment.44  Furthermore, this statute 
reaches the conduct of institutional state actors.45  In effect, the 
Court held that the statute grants a federal cause of action to 
“parties deprived of constitutional rights, privileges and 
immunities by an official’s abuse of his position” against state 
actors, such as police officers.46  The Court found that Congress 
may override state police power, even when “[i]mmunity is given 
to crime,” as is the case when a police department shields officers 
who engage in misconduct from legal recourse.47  In fact, the Court 
highlighted legislative history wherein the Antebellum Congress 
sought to remedy violations of civil rights where state officials, 
serving as sheriffs, upheld practices denying civil rights to a 
certain class of people and remained at their posts with no 
reproach from other citizens or the state.48  The Court then 
described that present-day police officers and departments who 
also functionally deprive citizens of their civil rights will be 
federally liable under this statute.49 
 
B. Private Citizens Attempt § 1983 Claims Against Police and 
Police Departments 
 
Following Monroe v. Pape, a critical element in a private citizen 
§ 1983 claim against a specific police officer is the causation 
analysis showing the officer was personally involved in the 
 
42 See Avidan Y. Cover, Reconstructing the Right Against Excessive Force, 68 FLA. L. 
REV. 1773, 1778; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2010).  
43 See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171 (1961). 
44 See id. 
45 See id. at 171-72. 
46 Id. at 172. 
47 See id. at 175. 
48 See id. at 177. 
49 See id. at 180. 
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unconstitutional conduct.50  An officer personally conducting an 
arrest almost certainly satisfies this requirement; however, 
officers who are on the scene and viewing the arrest process may 
or may not be jointly liable.51  Plaintiffs’ arguments against 
participating officers hinged on those officers’ awareness of the 
wrong committed.52  When an officer was unaware of the civil 
rights deprivation, a plaintiff could not recover against the 
bystander-officer.53  If, on the other hand, the bystander-officer 
was aware of the unconstitutional conduct, and failed to prevent 
unlawful behavior, the plaintiff could recover against the 
bystander-officer.54  For instance, when two officers guarded a 
room while a plaintiff screamed in pain as he was beaten with 
nightsticks by a third officer, the court found that the two 
guarding officers heard and understood a beating was going on, 
and therefore were liable for failing to protect the plaintiff because, 
“a police officer may not ignore the duty imposed by his office and 
fail to stop other officers who summarily punish a third person in 
his presence or otherwise within his knowledge.”55 
Arguably, § 1983 claims against supervisors of delinquent 
officers involved in unlawful conduct are more effective than 
claims against individual officer because they may incentivize 
internal reforms.56  Furthermore, society receives the message 
that such conduct is a system-wide issue and not a dismissible, 
isolated incident when claims are brought against supervisors.57  
However, supervisor claims are significantly more nuanced than 
claims against individual officers and are thus harder to prove 
under § 1983.58  In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the plaintiffs allegedly 
experienced unlawful force while detained because of 
discrimination on the basis of national origin, Muslim religion and 
 
50 See MICHAEL AVERY ET AL., POLICE MISCONDUCT: LAW AND LITIGATION 340 (3d ed. 
2017). 
51 See id. 
52 See Byrd v. Brishke, 466 F.2d 6, 10-11 (7th Cir. 1972). 
53 See Michael Avery et al., Police Misconduct: Law and Litigation Highlights § 4:2 
(2018).  
54 See Byrd, 466 F.2d at 10-11.  
55 See id. at 9-11. 
56 See AVERY ET AL., supra note 53, at 346. 
57 See id. at 346–47.  
58 See id. at 347-48. 
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race.59  In this case, the Supreme Court effectively indemnified 
high level supervisors from personal liability because “mere 
knowledge of [a] subordinate’s discriminatory purpose” does not 
meet the burden of proof. 60  The supervisors’ mental state of 
“knowledge” or “acquiescence” to discrimination carried out by 
subordinates was not enough to be the discriminatory purpose 
element necessary to succeed on a claim.61   
Moreover, in Wellington v. Daniels, a witness testified that the 
plaintiff ran away from an officer, posing no threat to the officer’s 
life; but, in order to apprehend and arrest him, the officer battered 
the plaintiff with a flashlight, causing permanent physical 
paralysis.62  The offending officer’s supervisor knew that the use 
of flashlights as a weapon causing serious injury or death was a 
national policing issue, but did not ban these flashlights or retrain 
his police to refrain from using them as a weapon, as other police 
forces around the nation had done.63 Still, the court found for the 
supervisor, indemnifying him of any liability for the subordinate’s 
overuse of force because the plaintiff “failed to establish a pattern 
of excessive use of force” necessary to support his claim.64 
Private plaintiffs sometimes bolstered their claims of supervisor 
liability using expert testimony.65  While this tactic assisted 
plaintiffs seeking recovery from an isolated incident, a private 
plaintiff who seeks accountability from a supervisor for patterns 
of discrimination may face procedural barriers that undermine the 
claim.66  For example, if a plaintiff seeks a remedy for patterns of 
discrimination under § 1983 using the injuries of other arrestees 
 
59 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 666 (2009).  
60 Id. at 677. 
61 See id. 
62 See Wellington v. Daniels, 717 F.2d 932, 934 (4th Cir. 1983). 
63 See id. at 936-37. 
64 See id. at 937-38. 
65 See AVERY ET AL., supra note 53, at 366. For example, in Gutierrez-Rodriguez v. 
Cartagena, officers approached a private citizen in an unmarked car with plain clothes and 
guns drawn and fired at the car when the citizen attempted to drive away, thereby injuring 
the plaintiff. See Gutierrez-Rodriguez v. Cartagena, 882 F.2d 553, 557 (1st Cir. 1989). The 
officer perpetrating misconduct had forty complaints against him for overuse of force and 
department records revealed no disciplinary action had been taken to investigate the 
officer. See id. at 565-66. Expert testimony established that this number of complaints going 
without investigation deviated from the acceptable norm in police departments. Id. Due to 
this deviation from standard practice, the court found the supervisor’s gross negligence akin 
to discriminatory intent. Id. 
66 See AVERY ET AL., supra note 53, at 366. 
DOCUMENT1 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/18/2020  5:43 PM 
2019] STRENGTHENING SECTION 14141 273 
to corroborate the plaintiff’s argument, the overall effect may be to 
lessen the effectiveness of the claim.67  Each witness called to 
testify on a similar deprivation of rights creates small trials within 
the larger trial.68  Judges and juries often find this process 
confusing and unnecessary.69  Moreover, the plaintiff may have 
difficulty finding numerous credible and cooperative witnesses to 
assist in the case.70  Thus, even after Monroe v. Pape, § 1983 claims 
against individual police officers and their supervisors often failed 
or were inadequate.71 
 
C. Limits on Police Department Liability Under § 1983 
 
Plaintiffs rarely succeed on claims against a municipality as an 
alternative remedy under § 1983 when their claims against 
individual officers failed.72 As with claims against an individual 
police officer, plaintiffs bringing claims against a municipality are 
required to satisfy Fourteenth Amendment requirements for 
discriminatory intent in addition to proving causation and 
culpability on the part of the municipality.73  Consequently, a 
plaintiff has to prove a local government should have known or 
knew about a discriminatory act and that the local government 
failed to rectify it.74  This cause of action requires evidence a 
plaintiff rarely can assemble because it requires time and 
resources to investigate thousands of police records.75  Moreover, 
a plaintiff may struggle to meet the evidentiary standard of 
“widespread practice” resulting in “constitutional violations” that 
are part of “policies or customs” held by the municipality.76  
For example, in Hicks-Field v. Harris County, a correctional 
officer responded to an inmate suffering from a schizophrenic 
 
67 See id.  
68 Id. 
69 See id.  
70 Id.  
71 See Harmon, supra note 23, at 11-12. 
72 See AVERY ET AL., supra note 53, at 368. 
73 See id. at 372. 
74 See id. n 2, at 389 
75 See id. at 365, 367.  
76 See id. at 379 (explaining that a plaintiff alleging a constitutional violation by a 
police department must show that those unconstitutional policies and procedures were in 
widespread use throughout the department). 
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attack by fatally punching him in the face and leaving the inmate 
unconscious.77  The officer violated protocol by leaving the inmate 
unattended rather than seeking medical attention for the inmate 
following the use of force.78  Another officer found the inmate, and 
took him to the hospital, where the inmate died.79  An autopsy 
confirmed homicide as the cause of death.80  Although the 
correctional officer directly inflicted violence on the inmate and 
personally avoided calling for medical help, under the applicable 
evidentiary standards, the municipality could not be held liable for 
this unconstitutional behavior.81  Here, the facts of this incident, 
the officer’s record, and a DOJ report on the conditions of the jail—
which was excluded from evidence—cumulatively failed to prove 
liability.82  Due to the report being excluded from trial, the plaintiff 
lost its strongest means of proving a pervasive occurrence of 
constitutional violations by the municipality, thus losing its § 1983 
claim against the city.83 
When private citizens attempted to use § 1983 claims to remedy 
patterns of police misconduct, the Supreme Court has resisted 
federal discipline of state police.  For example, in 1976, plaintiffs 
in Rizzo v. Goode demanded federal oversight of the Philadelphia 
Police Department, alleging a pervasive pattern of depriving 
constitutional rights of African Americans and city residents at 
large.84  Though this request would become the purpose and power 
of 42 U.S.C. § 14141, here, the Supreme Court struck down 
plaintiffs’ request because principles of federalism required that 
any discipline of police remain in the hands of the state.85  Indeed, 
 
77 See Hicks-Fields v. Harris Cty., 860 F.3d 803, 806-07 (5th Cir. 2017), aff’g Hicks-
Fields v. Harris Cty., No. H-12-3650, 2015 WL 9581844 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 30, 2015). 
78 Id. at 807. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
81 See id. at 808. 
82 See id. at 809-10. 
83 Id. at 811 (holding that plaintiff’s evidence was not “sufficient to establish an official 
policy of Harris County” because there was no proof of persistent, widespread practices 
within Harris County). But see Grandstaff v. City of Borger, 767 F.2d 161, 171 (5th Cir. 
1985) (holding that courts may however infer “policy or custom” when a city neglects 
extremely inappropriate officer conduct; for example, when the city of Borger, Texas did not 
investigate the officers who recklessly shot an innocent man in the back, fatally wounding 
and killing him, the court reasoned the police department sanctioned reckless use of force 
as a general policy). 
84 See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 362 (1976). 
85 See id. at 366. 
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the Court found the plaintiffs’ goal of preventing future abuses by 
the department at large irrational because the abuses were only 
committed by a small, unnamed minority of the force.86 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court reasoned an entire department 
may not be held lable for the actions of theres engaging in unlawful 
police procedures where a small level of police misconduct inheres 
in urban environments.87  Thus, the plaintiffs could not build a 
case for systemic police reform.88 
In 1980, the U.S. government sued the City of Philadelphia, 
alleging systemic police misconduct.89  The DOJ pleaded the city’s 
the civil rights abuses included, but were not limited to, 
unwarranted searches and seizures, excessive force, denial of legal 
counsel and racial slurs committed by a large number of the 
force.90  The DOJ argued the department had a system to suppress 
public reporting of these abuses and to extricate officers from 
liability.91  Nevertheless, the court held the even these specific 
allegations did not satisfy a case holding the City of Philadelphia 
accountable.92  Furthermore, the court adamantly found the DOJ’s 
case dangerous to federalism because police power is specifically 
delegated to the states.93  In effect, the court indemnified police 
departments from federal redress. 
In U.S. v. City of Philadelphia, the dissent argued that federal 
intrusion upon state governments is the exact purpose of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. § 
1983).94  Dismissing the majority’s federalism argument that 
estopped the United States from holding the Philadelphia Police 
Department accountable, Circuit Judge Gibbons explained that: 
“[T]he [F]ourteenth [A]mendment and the Civil Rights Acts are 
what intervene in the workings of local government.  They were 
intended to intervene.  The relief which the federal Executive 
 
86 See id. at 372. 
87 See id. at 375. 
88 See id. at 366. 
89 See United States v. City of Phila., 644 F.2d 187, 189-90 (3d Cir. 1980). 
90 Id. at 190; cf Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 372-73 (noting fear of a “small, unnamed minority“ 
of police officers’ future conduct was insufficient to give plaintiffs a personal stake in the 
outcome). 
91 City of Phila., 644 F.2d at 190. 
92 See id. at 205-06. 
93 See id. at 206. 
94 Id. at 227 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).  
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seeks is nothing more than [what] the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment 
and the Civil Rights Acts require . . . .”95  Nearly a decade and a 
half later, this argument would be embodied in the enactment of 
42 U.S.C. § 14141.  
 
II. IMPETUS FOR 42 U.S.C. § 14141 
 
Unrelenting racial tension in the 1990s called congressional 
attention to the lack of legal framework to hold police institutions 
accountable.96  In particular, the public documentation of the 
Rodney King beating in 1991 in Los Angeles brought the 
inadequacy of legal remedies for police brutality to the American 
consciousness.97  The at-home videotape recorded by a neighbor 
captured shocking images of excessive use of violence by police, 
thereby bringing the systemic abuse experienced by inner-city 
communities to the national stage.98  Local judicial action was 
insufficient to address the wrongs against the community because, 
even after the clear record of violence, the police personnel 
involved were acquitted.99  Public outcry ensued.100  Already tense 
relations between the community and police deteriorated 
completely as residents of King’s neighborhood expressed their 
frustration through historic riots, costing the city of South Los 
Angeles one billion dollars in damage.101  Congress responded to 
the crisis with the passage of 42 U.S.C. §14141.102 
 
95 Id. at 228. 
96 See Brandon E. Patterson, Rodney King and the LA Riots Changed Policing. Now 
Jeff Sessions Wants to Turn Back the Clock., MOTHER JONES (Apr. 27, 2017), 
https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2017/04/rodney-king-jeff-sessions-consent-decrees-
policing/. 
97 See Fighting Police Abuse: A Community Action Manual, ACLU, 
https://www.aclu.org/other/fighting-police-abuse-community-action-manual (last visited 
Sept. 23, 2019). 
98 See id.  
99 Rodney King beating reverberated for years, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 1, 2016, 3:15 PM), 
http://timelines.latimes.com/rodney-king/.  
100 Id.  
101 Jennifer Medina, The L.A. Riots 25 Years Later: A Return to the Epicenter, N.Y. 





102 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION’S PATTERN AND PRACTICE 
POLICE REFORM WORK: 1994-PRESENT 3 (2017), 
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A. Legal Framework for 42 U.S.C. § 14141 
 
Under 42 U.S.C. § 14141, the federal government may sue a 
municipality when the U.S. Attorney General has reasonable 
cause to believe that: 
[A] governmental authority, or any agent thereof, or any person 
acting on behalf of a governmental authority, [has] engage[d] in a 
pattern or practice of conduct by law enforcement officers or by 
officials or employees of any governmental agency with 
responsibility for the administration of juvenile justice or the 
incarceration of juveniles that deprives persons of rights, 
privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution 
or laws of the United States.103 
Suits brought under this statute are meant to eliminate 
“patterns or practices” and provide equitable relief.104  First, the 
DOJ conducts a preliminary investigation.105  The DOJ may call 
for an investigation on its own accord,106 or at the demand of city 
residents.107  There are even instances of state governments 
asking for a federal investigation to help them properly address 
civil rights violations in certain police departments.108  Thus, the 
punitive association with federal investigations is misconstrued.  
Rather, federal investigations seek to help local departments meet 
their policing goals by eliminating systemic misconduct. 
If the initial review suggests systemic issues within a police 
department, the DOJ proceeds to the second step of conducting a 
formal investigation to determine whether legal action against a 
 
https://www.justice.gov/crt/file/922421/download [hereinafter PATTERN AND PRACTICE 
POLICE REFORM WORK]. 
103 See 34 U.S.C. § 12601 (2018) (formerly cited as 42 U.S.C. § 14141).  
104 See id. 
105 See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, How Department of Justice Civil Rights Division 
Conducts Pattern-or-Practice Investigations, 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/797676/download [hereinafter DOJ Investigations Paper] 
(last visited Sept. 15, 2019). 
106 See id.  
107 See Sari Horwitz et al., Justice Department will investigate practices of Chicago 
police, WASH. POST (Dec. 6, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-
nation/wp/2015/12/06/justice-department-will-launch-investigation-into-practices-of-
chicago-police/. 
108 See Debo P. Adegbile, Policing Through an American Prism, 126 YALE L. J. 2222, 
2256 (2017). 
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municipality is appropriate.109  Although formal cases against 
police departments followed high profile incidents like the 2001 
shooting of Timothy Thomas in Cleveland, Ohio110 and the 2014 
shooting of Mike Brown in Ferguson, Missouri,111 one incident is 
not enough to bring about a case.112  Instead, a cause of action is 
only substantiated when investigations reveal repeated, 
systematic unlawful behavior including, but not limited to, 
patterns of excessive use of force, promotion systems rewarding 
those who engage in excessive force, and systems suppressing 
citizen complaints against officers.113 
Third, the DOJ initiates litigation against a police 
department.114  Not all matters end up in trial.  Some departments 
agree to pre-trial settlements called “memorandums of 
agreement,” whereas departments who take cases to trial are 
bound by court ordered agreements called “consent decrees.”115  
Both memorandums of agreement and consent decrees are 
enforceable in court.116  Finally, the fourth step is implementation 
of the memorandum of agreement or the consent decree.117 
There have been sixty-nine pattern or practice investigations 
since 1994.118  These actions include one-hundred thirty-two 
different allegations, forty-eight attributable to excessive use of 
force, thirty-eight for discriminatory policing, twenty-nine for 
unlawful stops, searches and/or seizures, five for unlawful arrests, 
four for poor jail conditions, and the remainder for gender bias in 
handling sexual assault reports, improper detentions, sexual 
misconduct, retaliation, improper treatment of the mentally ill 
 
109 See DOJ Investigations Paper, supra note 109.  
110 See The Associated Press, Cincinnati Officer Is Acquitted in Killing That Ignited 
Unrest, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/27/us/cincinnati-
officer-is-acquitted-in-killing-that-ignited-unrest.html. 
111 See Larry Buchanan et al., What Happened in Ferguson?, N.Y. TIMES, 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/08/13/us/ferguson-missouri-town-under-siege-
after-police-shooting.html (last updated Aug. 10, 2015). 
112 See DOJ Investigations Paper, supra note 109. 
113 Id.  
114 Id.  
115 See PATTERN AND PRACTICE POLICE REFORM WORK, supra note 106, at 20. 
116 Id. at 20-21. 
117 See id. at 21. 
118 Fixing the Force, Allegations, FRONTLINE, 
http://apps.frontline.org/fixingtheforce/#allegations (last visited Aug. 31, 2019). 
DOCUMENT1 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/18/2020  5:43 PM 
2019] STRENGTHENING SECTION 14141 279 
and violation of due process.119  Eighteen of these actions reached 
a so-called “closed” agreement because the police department met 
DOJ standards and maintained those standards for two 
consecutive years.120  A third of the departments reforming 
excessive use of force took nine years or more to eliminate 
unlawful policing practices.121  Twenty-one actions are ongoing.122 
Though some ongoing agreements are recent and fall within a 
five to seven year time frame to make reforms, other cities where 
there are layered charges of unconstitutional policing—such as 
excessive force paired with unlawful searches and seizures—have 
been under federal review for over a decade.123 These extreme 
examples include the Detroit, Michigan Police Department, which 
was under a consent decree for eleven years to reform excessive 
force, unlawful searches, and seizures, as well as poor jail 
conditions.124 At present, Detroit is no longer under a formal 
decree but must still adhere to a “transitional agreement” 
permitting continued federal surveillance.125 Likewise, the 
Warren, Ohio Police Department has been in and out of federal 
surveillance under short-term agreements since 2004 and has 
been under a consent decree since 2012.126  Presently, officials 
report that the Warren Police Department still has significant 
changes to make regarding excessive use of force.127 
 
B. Common Changes Proposed by the Department of Justice 
 
The implementation of a settlement agreement involves police 
departments fulfilling recommendations from the DOJ.128  These 
standards often involve changing the mode of policing from that 
which emphasizes use of racial profiling and violence to that which 






123 See id.  
124 Fixing the Force, Allegations, supra note 121. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. 
127 See id. 
128 See United States v. East Haven, No. 3:12-CV-1652(AWT), 2012 WL 5860787 (D. 
Conn. Nov. 20, 2012) (Settlement Agreement and Order).  
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“community policing.”129  Tactics in policing vary widely across the 
country because every police department varies in size, funding, 
and socio-economic community.130  Nevertheless, there are certain 
practices which epitomize the mission of community policing.131  
For example, the New Orleans Police Department executed the 
tenets of community partnership and problem-solving by 
innovating a Community-Police Mediation Program to address 
police misconduct complaints.132  In New Orleans, a city resident 
alleging excessive force, excessive violence, or deprivation of due 
process rights will meet with the officer and two specially trained 
community-police mediators.133  One mediator is of the same socio-
economic and racial background as the officer and one is of the 
same background as the civilian.134  The mediation location 
communicates partnership rather than punitive action because it 
is held in community-valued spaces like libraries, recreation 
centers, and public schools.135  Thus, the mediation process is 
structured to rectify any violations of law by police and create a 
collaborative relationship between civilians and police.  This 
reparative function further supports the community policing goal 
of crime prevention by increasing the likelihood civilians will feel 
safe reporting crime and tipping police off to persons driving crime. 
Another popular community policing policy is de-escalation 
training.136  Those police departments with reported excessive use 
of force reframe their problem-solving methods from those which 
rely on deadly force to secure a suspect to those which slow the 
arrest process down to reduce tension between the civilian and the 
 
129 See U.S. Dep’t of Just., Community Policing Defined, 1, 3, 
https://cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/vets-to-cops/e030917193-CP-Defined.pdf [hereinafter 
Community Policing Defined] (last visited Aug. 31, 2019). 
130 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Principles for Promoting Police Integrity: Examples of 
Promising Police Practices and Policies, 1, 1, https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojp/186189.pdf 
(2001). 
131 Community Policing Defined, supra note 134, at 3-4. 
132 See Lou Furman & Alison R. McCrary, Feature: Building Trust in Law 
Enforcement: Community-Police Mediation in New Orleans, 63 L.A. B. J. 192, 192 (2015). 
133 See id. 
134 See id. 
135 Id. 
136 See Tom Jackman, De-esclation training to reduce police shootings facing mixed 
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officer.137  For example, when Camden, New Jersey officers 
encountered a potentially mentally ill civilian brandishing a knife 
in the street, the officers followed the civilian on foot until the 
optimal moment to disarm him.138  The officers achieved a 
community policing goal by resisting the traditional “shoot first” 
training and instead finding a way to complete the arrest without 
deadly force.139  The police commissioner in Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, Robert Haas, expressed the importance of de-
escalation by saying, “If I back away and the person calms down 
and the situation resolves itself, then I’ve done what I came to 
do.”140 
However, a proper community policing program is comprised of 
four more components.141  First, police departments should 
institutionalize frequent, positive officer and community member 
communications outside of the arrest context.142  The DOJ 
recommends departments create police athletic leagues that 
engage local families to participate as well.143  This tactic is 
particularly useful when it engages disconnected residents in 
large housing projects because it creates a sense of trust residents 
are willing to rely on when crimes do occur.144  Thus, project 
residents are more likely to provide police information needed to 
solve crimes than without a previously established relationship.145 
Second, the DOJ asks departments to move from twelve-hour 
rotating shifts to keeping the same officers consistently patrolling 
the same sections of their precinct.146 This seemingly particular 
recommendation serves the broader purpose of personalizing the 
 
137 See Matt Apuzzo, Police Rethink Long Tradition on Using Force, N.Y. TIMES (May 
4, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/05/us/police-start-to-reconsider-longstanding-
rules-on-using-force.html. 
138 See Jackman, supra note 140.  
139 See id. 
140 Timothy Williams, Long Taught to Use Force, Police Warily Learn to De-escalate, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/28/us/long-taught-to-use-
force-police-warily-learn-to-de-escalate.html. 
141 See U.S. Dep’t Just. Civ. Rts. Div., Investigation of the Ferguson Police 
Department 1, 90 (Mar. 4, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-
releases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf [hereinafter 
Investigation of the Ferguson Police Department]. 
142 See id. 
143 See id. 
144 See id. 
145 Id. at 80.  
146 Id. at 90.  
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civilians being policed so they are less likely to be seen as the 
stereotype of a criminal.147  This reassignment of police is paired 
with anti-discrimination and anti-bias training to re-train police 
away from basing investigative work on racial profiling.148  
Furthermore, where racial tensions are particularly high, the DOJ 
recommends police construct cultural awareness programs with 
community leaders, wherein the leaders create programs needed 
to reduce bias against their ethnic group.149 
The next critical component is organizational transformation.  
The Office of Community Oriented Policing (COPS) describes 
organizational transformation as “[t]he alignment of 
organizational management, structure, personnel, and 
information systems to support community partnerships and 
proactive problem-solving.”150  This broad definition provides little 
guidance.  More telling are specific DOJ recommendations for 
transforming police departments who repeatedly deprive citizens’ 
constitutional rights.  For instance, in New Orleans, the 
organizational transformation was geared toward creating a 
process to identify excessive use of force, investigate 
unconstitutional conduct and properly reprimand officers 
violating civilians’ civil rights.151  Particularly, the DOJ sought 
changes in promotion systems because the conduct of officers who 
receive leadership positions dictates the policing culture.152  
Promotion systems that elevate officers who repeatedly use 
excessive force incentivize civil rights violations.153  Conversely, 
promotion systems that reward officers who achieve arrests and 
investigations without repeated complaints of violence and racial 
 
147 See U.S. Dep’t Just. Civ. Rts. Div., supra note 145 at 87.  
148 Id. at 94.  
149 See U.S. Dep’t Just. Civ. Rts. Div. & U.S. Atty’s Off. N. Dist. Ill., Investigation of 
the Chicago Police Dep’t 1, 161 (2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/925846/download 
[hereinafter Investigation of the Chicago Police Dep’t]. 
150 Community Oriented Policing Services, Measure Community Policing for Free, 
U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Apr. 2015), http://cops.usdoj.gov/html/dispatch/04-
2015/measure_cp_for_free.asp.  
151 See U.S. Dep’t Just. Civ. Rts. Div., Investigation of the New Orleans Police Dep’t 2, 
75-76 (2011), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2011/03/17/nopd_report.pdf. 
152 See id. at xvi-xvii.  
153 See id. at 66 (explaining that “problematic performance evaluations” lead to officers 
being “promoted to supervisory positions when they are not ready or are unqualified to 
supervise”).  
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profiling incentivize ethical policing.154  Changing criteria, such as 
changing point allocations on promotion evaluations, is a practical 
application of organizational change.155 
Notably, organizational change can also mean changing the 
allocation or police resources.156  For example, Baltimore is known 
for having “two cities:” a white Baltimore and a black Baltimore.157  
In white neighborhoods, the Baltimore Police Department (BPD) 
were more responsive to complaints.158  The BPD even conducted 
a number of community policing style programs like meetings with 
community leaders and the like in white neighborhoods.159  
Conversely, the BPD repeatedly neglected resident calls from 
minority neighborhoods for police assistance.160  When the BPD 
did work in black precincts the response consistently included 
physical force or verbal threats.161  In fact, when a female 
resident’s home was being searched and she asked for the reason 
for the search, BPD officers replied, “shut the fuck up bitch and sit 
the fuck down because [we are] the fucking law.”162  The DOJ 
decided the diametrically different treatment of the white and 
black communities can only be changed with organizational 
change through equitable allocation of police officers and requiring 
that department leaders engage in the community engagement 
programs used in white neighborhoods in black precincts as 
well.163  Thus, departments may use certain aspects of community 
 
154 See id. at 11.  
155 See id. at 78.  
156 See U.S. Dep’t Just. Civ. Rts. Div., Investigation of the Baltimore City Police Dep’t 
1, 5 (2016), https://www.justice.gov/crt/file/883296/download [hereinafter Investigation of 
the Baltimore City Police Dep’t].  
157 Id. at 4-5.  
158 See id. at 5. 
159 See id. at 156, 160 (explaining, separately, that police are perceived as more 
attentive in white neighborhoods, and have only focused community policing efforts on a 
select few neighborhoods; it follows that the white neighborhoods have received better 
community policing efforts).  
160 See id. at 156.  
161 See id. at 157.  
162 Investigation of the Baltimore City Police Dep’t, supra 160, at 157. 
163 See id. at 160 (explaining that community policing must be more widespread and 
fully integrated equally into all communities regardless of demographic).  
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policing and still need organizational change through equitable 
allocation of police resources.164 
Organizational change is not only important for implementing 
positive changes; it is also integral to ending unconstitutional 
police conduct.  For example, in Ferguson, Missouri, the DOJ pin-
pointed processes that curtail excessive use of force.165  First, the 
DOJ recommended eliminating informal and formal arrest quotas 
to eliminate perceptions that those who make the most arrests are 
the best officers.166  Second, all stops, searches, and arrests must 
include reports of the facts giving rise to legal authority for that 
arrest.167  Third, supervisors must review officer reports for 
adequate reasoning for the arrest.168  Notably, these reports are 
analyzed for racial trends to identify any disparate treatment in 
arrests.169  These procedural checkpoints self-monitor internal 
department culture around the use of force, thereby positioning 
police and civilian interactions in-line with community policing 
values. 
Lastly, a final prong common under the organizational change 
objective of community policing is aligning police training to 
support the partnership goals with which they are tasked.170  For 
example, many community policing reports emphasize working 
with “diverse” community leaders.171  In practice, this means 
working with leaders of not only racial minority groups, but 
religious minorities like Muslims, communities for whom English 
is a second language, and the LGBTQ community.172  Accordingly, 
departments must provide anti-bias training that prepares officers 
to communicate with the particular set of socio-economic groups 
their precincts protect.173  Yet, as the DOJ notes, departments 
cannot satisfy training objectives by “sitting in a classroom” for 
 
164 See id. at 156 (stressing that community policing applied only in wealthier white 
neighborhoods is inadequate; instead, more community policing needs to occur in minority 
neighborhoods).  
165 See Investigation of the Ferguson Police Department, supra note 145, at 92.  
166 See id. at 91.  
167 Id.  
168 Id. at 92. 
169 See id. at 91–92. 
170 See Investigation of the Chicago Police Dep’t, supra note 153, at 160. 
171 See id. 
172 See id. 
173 See id. at 160–61. 
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hours but, rather, must satisfy such objectives with “meaningful 
content.”174  Thus, training on the constitutional procedure of 
arrests should not simply be a thirty-five-year-old video that is 
inaccurate to current constitutional standards for police, 
accompanied by a check-the-box worksheet quiz.175  Instead, 
training must teach police the lawful boundaries for use of force 
and incorporate simulation training so that de-escalation tactics 
are more likely to be used in the fast-paced arrest setting.176  
Through proper training, police are not simply confident to patrol 
streets, but competent to fulfill their duties in a lawful manner. 
 
C. Best Practices Under § 14141 for Lasting Reform 
 
Some advocates, including Former Attorney General Jeff 
Sessions, argue against the relative value of consent decrees, 
questioning the long-term value of federal oversight.177  First, this 
section responds to skepticism of § 14141 federal oversight by 
identifying how the consent decrees in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; 
Cincinnati, Ohio; and Los Angeles, California created institutional 
reform.  Moreover, this section differentiates the tactics used in 
these case study cities that undermined long-term reform, from 
those that supported long-term reform.  Finally, this section 
identifies local leadership, community-driven reform objectives 
and community oversight of police departments as keystones to 
lasting reform under § 14141. 
In Pittsburg, which was the first city bound to federal oversight 
under § 14141 legislation, the short-term results markedly shifted 
police culture.178  However political shifts in leadership resulted 
 
174 Id. at 94. 
175 Id. at. 95. Investigation of Chicago Police Academy training revealed a course on 
the use of deadly force based on a video series created thirty-five years ago. Id. Since this 
video had been produced, the Supreme Court has heightened the standards for the 
reasonable use of force. Id. 
176 Id. at 151. 
177 See Eric Lichtblau, Sessions Indicates Justice Department Will Stop Monitoring 
Troubled Police Agencies, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 28, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/28/us/politics/jeff-sessions-crime.html. 
178 See Robert C. Davis, Nicole J. Henderson, & Christopher W. Ortiz, Can Federal 
Intervention Bring Lasting Improvement in Local Policing: The Pittsburgh Consent Decree, 
VERA INST. JUST. ii, 40 (2005). 
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in severe backsliding.179  For instance, in the first year following 
the end of federal oversight in Pittsburgh, the community viewed 
police as “helpers of victims of crime” because the police 
department maintained reform initiatives such as officer training 
and use of force oversight.180  These changes continued for a 
decade under the former Police Chief Robert McNeilly Jr., who felt 
an obligation to his city to maintain terms of the consent decree.181  
McNeilly created cutting-edge systems including a modern use-of-
force policy and a computerized early warning system to identify 
officer misconduct.182  These innovations were so effective, police 
departments around the country studied the Pittsburg model and 
implemented similar systems.183 
However, when the mayor fired McNeilly in 2006 and replaced 
him with Nathan Harper in the hopes of moving the police 
department in a different direction, the commitment to the 
systems setup by McNeilly eroded.184  First, empirically, the 
yearly number of use-of-force incidents rose by 38% and the 
number of assaults committed against officers rose by 49% under 
Harper, all while both property and violent crime trended down, 
indicating a breakdown in the policing system.185  Second, former 
Police Chief Harper was indicted in 2013 on conspiracy charges 
because he used state funds for personal use.186 Then, in 2014, 
three undercover police officers brutally beat Jordan Miles, a 
young African-American high school student who was initially 
running from the officers because he thought the plain-clothes 
 
179 See Joshua Chanin, Evaluating Section 14141: An Empirical Review of Pattern or 
Practice Police Misconduct Reform, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 67, 78 (2016) (implying that 
mayoral changes has negatively impacted police accountability and the relationship 
between police and the communities they serve).  
180 Id. at 77–78. 
181 See Michael A. Fuoco, Police chief McNeilly’s tenure saw wrenching changes, PITT. 
POST-GAZETTE (Jan. 9. 2006), https://www.post-gazette.com/local/city/2006/01/09/Police-
chief-McNeilly-s-tenure-saw-wrenching-changes/stories/200601090107. 
182 See id. 
183 See id. 
184 See Chanin, supra note 183, at 81–83. 
185 Id. at 82. 
186 See Press Release, W. Dist. Pa. U.S. Atty’s Off., Former Pittsburgh Police Chief 
Charged with Conspiracy, Failure To File Federal Tax Returns (Mar. 22, 2013), 
https://www.justice.gov/usao-wdpa/pr/former-pittsburgh-police-chief-charged-conspiracy-
failure-file-federal-tax-returns. 
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men were following him to rob him.187  Thus, under new 
leadership, the reform in Pittsburg regressed to the same violent 
arrest procedure which sparked the initial call for reform.  
Pittsburg’s reliance on the leadership of the former mayor and 
former Police Chief McNeilly illustrates the danger resting an 
entire movement of change in one administration.  Indeed, 
departments who follow this path will lack the institutional 
strength to withstand changes in leadership.  Instead, reform 
efforts must remain vigilant against depending predominantly on 
leaders and political timing to enact change.  It follows that if, on 
the contrary, the § 14141 reform process includes interest groups 
outside of city leadership, then reform can withstand fluctuating 
political priorities. 
For example, in Cincinnati, the city fell under federal oversight 
for five years following the unarmed shooting of a black teenager, 
Timothy Thomas, in 2001.188  The Cincinnati Police Department 
(“CPD”) achieved full reforms of their consent agreement within 
five years.189  Moreover, six years following federal oversight, 
researchers found no reform erosion.190  Relationships between 
the community and police remained strong even following a 2014 
incident of the police shooting of Donyale Rowe because the CPD 
immediately published the video footage of the incident to the 
public and disciplined the officer involved.191  Scholars attribute 
Cincinnati’s lasting commitment to transparency and lawful 
policing to the two-pronged legal mechanism binding the city to 
reform.192  The CPD signed a memorandum of agreement with the 
DOJ and signed a concurrent collaborative agreement with both 
the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) and the Fraternal 
 
187 See Rich Lord & Liz Navratil, Jordan Miles jury reaches split verdict, PITT. POST-
GAZETTE (Mar. 31, 2014), https://www.post-gazette.com/local/city/2014/03/31/Jury-reaches-
verdict-in-Jordan-Miles-civil-trial/stories/201403310142. 
188 See Chanin, supra note 183 at 91; see also The Associated Press, Cincinnati Officer 
Is Acquitted in Killing That Ignited Unrest, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2001), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/27/us/cincinnati-officer-is-acquitted-in-killing-that-
ignited-unrest.html. 
189 See Chanin, supra note 183 at 91, 94. 
190 Id. at 91. 
191 See id. at 94. 
192 See id. at 91; Elliot H. Schatmeier, Reforming Police Use-of-Force Practices: A Case 
Study of The Cincinnati Police Department, 46 COLUM. J. L. & SOC. PROBS. 540, 557, 562 
(2013). 
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Order of Police (“FOP”).193 Each stage of the reform process 
involved feedback from the community in which people’s rights 
were deprived under previous policies and the police who would be 
carrying out new policies.194  More to the point, by incorporating 
stakeholder interests in policy creation the city made a durable 
agreement between the community and police. 
Cincinnati’s second feature enabling long-term reform is the 
legal enforceability of the collaborative agreement which 
empowered the ACLU and FOP to seek judicial remedies against 
the Cincinnati Police Department when met with resistance 
against their requested reforms.195  Specifically, the collaborative 
agreement permitted court sanctions against the CPD for non-
compliance and court-ordered mediation to prevent further 
breaches of the agreement.196  In fact, the ACLU and FOP sought 
court remedies against the CPD in 2004 because the police 
department refused to meet policing standards under § 14141 
reform.197  The court responded by placing the parties in court-
ordered mediation where the ACLU, FOP, and CPD came to an 
agreement on local solutions for meeting the federal standards.198 
Strikingly, the CPD began substantive reforms following the 
court-ordered mediation that continued through the term of 
federal supervision and beyond.199 
In Los Angeles, the DOJ placed the police department under 
federal oversight through a consent decree for twelve years, from 
2001 to 2013.200  The decree focused reforms around issues of 
 
193 Schatmeier, supra note 196, at 557; see Memorandum of Agreement Between The 
U.S. Dep’t Of Justice And The City of Cincinnati, Ohio and the Cincinnati Police Dep’t, U.S. 
DEP’T JUST. (Aug. 6, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/crt/memorandum- agreement-between-
united-states-department-justice-and-city-cincinnati-ohio-and (Aug. 6, 2015). 
194 See Schatmeier, supra note 196, at 558.  
195 See id. at 567, 577 (stating that “the CA’s inclusion of the ACLU and the FOP as 
parties made the reforms more legitimate and more effective”).  
196 Id. at 567. 
197 Id. at 577 (stating that plaintiff’s taking an active role in the MOA reforms helped 
prevent future breaches of the MOA and CA).  
198 See id.  
199 See id. at 586 (emphasizing that substantive reforms included a reduction in use-
of-force violations, increased citizen satisfaction with the police department, and a change 
in the culture of Cincinnati’s policing from a materialistic model to one emphasizing 
problem-solving and community interaction). 
200 Chanin, supra note 183, at 102.  
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excessive use of force and unlawful searches and seizures.201  Los 
Angeles achieved improvement in these areas by mimicking 
tactics of former Pittsburgh Police Chief McNeilly, such as 
computerized early misconduct identification systems, officer re-
training, and strengthening its own oversight bodies to enforce 
accountability even after federal oversight lifted.202  Los Angeles 
Police Chief Charlie Beck described the consent decree as the 
“catalyst” to making the department “transparent and . . . more 
effective than we’ve ever been.”203  Scholars attribute the shift in 
transparency to the consent decree strengthening the oversight 
role of the Police Commission and community civil rights 
organizations.204  Notably, real change occurred only after a 
decade of oversight suggesting that adequate time increases 
effectiveness of § 14141 reforms. 
 
III. RECOMMENDATIONS: AMENDING § 14141 FOR LONG TERM 
TRANSFORMATION 
 
Congress should amend 42 U.S.C. § 14141 to create an 
additional legal mechanism compelling police departments to set 
a concurrent agreement with stakeholder groups when they reach 
a memorandum of agreement or a consent decree with the DOJ.205  
This would ensure that the reform process represents both police 
stakeholder interests and community socio-economic group 
interests, thereby creating durable change.206  The stakeholder 
 
201 Id.; see U.S. v. City of L.A. – Consent Decree – Introduction, U.S. DEP’T JUST., 
https://www.justice.gov/crt/us-v-city-los-angeles-consent-decree-introduction (last visited 
Sept. 15, 2019). 
202 See Chanin, supra note 183, at 102; see also Fuoco, supra note 185 (“One frequently 
cited example of the [Pittsburgh Police] [D]epartment’s ‘best practices’ is a computerized 
early-warning system that analyzes all aspects of an officer’s job performance so that hints 
of trouble can be detected and dealt with quickly.”).  
203 Joel Rubin, Federal judge lifts LAPD consent decree, L.A. TIMES (May 16, 2013, 
12:00 AM), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/may/16/local/la-me-lapd-consent-decree-
20130517. 
204 Chanin, supra note 183, at 107. 
205 See Schatmeier, supra note 196, at 572 (emphasizing how implementing a more 
effective leadership model that improves accountability, transparency, and stakeholder 
input will lead to positive change).  
206 See id. at 576 (describing how the Cincinnati Police Department designed programs 
where community members worked with the police department on solutions to community 
problems, which has led to innovative solutions, including programs to reduce violence and 
police use-of-force incidents).  
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concurrent agreement would likewise be valid in a court of law and 
will conclude simultaneously with the close of the settlement 
agreement. 
The reasoning for this amendment is two-pronged.  First, as 
with the CPD, reform will no longer exist as a top-down process 
that departments struggle to implement.  Instead, the stakeholder 
groups will help shape the mandated reform to policies uniquely 
appropriate to the city and police department.207  Second, the 
community groups will have a legal mechanism to act as an 
oversight body.  For instance, in Cincinnati, the legal enforcement 
of community oversight has had a more lasting effect than in Los 
Angeles where the community role is variable with political 
changes.208  Furthermore, statutorily empowering groups like 
police unions and civil rights organizations adds these groups to 
the institutional framework to avoid drastic reform erosion.  
Through this new mechanism we prevent the Pittsburgh 
phenomenon, where the only institution with decision-making 
power after federal oversight ended was the police department 
itself.  Consequently, adding legal mechanisms empowering 
stakeholders creates a local oversight body who can hold police 
departments accountable after the federal government leaves. 
The amendment to § 14141 would read: 
Any department entering a memorandum of agreement or 
consent decree with the United States government will enter a 
concurrent agreement with stakeholder groups from its 
jurisdiction. The stakeholder agreement shall include as plaintiffs 
both groups representing police and groups representing 
community civil rights advocates. The stakeholder agreement will 
remain in effect until the settlement agreement or 
consent decree closes. 
Under this statute stakeholders are defined as local groups 
representing the city residents and the local police union.  
Similarly, the statute specifies that both the police and citizen 
 
207 Id. at 577 (“Participation in [] negotiations by representatives from all the groups 
substantially affected pattern or practice reforms [in Cincinnati], e.g., police officers, police 
management, the DOJ, the City, and various city interest groups; improves upon command 
and control regulation because broad participation legitimizes the decisions made by the 
representatives with the parties they represent and the general public.”).  
208 See Chanin, supra note 183, at 108 (emphasizing how this process has sustained 
positive effects where numbers of post-reform citizen complaints have continued to decline, 
as did the use of force incidence, and the number of injuries sustained by CPD officers).  
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groups must be represented for the collaborative agreement to be 
valid because involvement of these groups was central to the 
success in Cincinnati.209  Through this dual representation, voices 
from all interested parties will be invested in creating and 
maintaining reform under § 14141. 
While the DOJ promulgates many recommendations 
surrounding community policing, at present it falls short of using 
the law to strengthen this ideal.  By adding this amendment, 
community groups can utilize the same tools as the DOJ such as 
injunctive relief to compel changes while the department is under 
review.  Likewise, by creating these coalitions as legally 
recognized institutions, the DOJ sets the standard that the 
consensus from the community is as valid as the consensus from 
those within the police department.  Through this improved legal 
mechanism, a new foundation for policing is created in 




This country was founded on a set of unalienable rights.  Since 
the Civil War, activists and legislators made changes to our 
statutory framework mandating that those human rights be 
accessible to all citizens.  The policing context should be no 
different.  Respect for police and police institutions is too often 
conflated with indemnity for all unlawful behavior ranging from 
deprivation of due process procedures to homicide. 
Innovations in civil rights law under 42 U.S.C. § 14141 created 
a framework for a new style of policing, one that is a “another kind 
of law enforcement altogether, one that understands people and 
just doesn’t put a uniform in our face.”210  In fact, federal 
investigations, oversight, and implementation of community 
policing has made marked changes in our communities.  
Notwithstanding these advances, there are still barriers to these 
changes having a lasting effect. 
 
209 See id. at 579. 
210 Lynh Bui & Peter Hermann, Baltimore mayor, police commissioner pledge to move 
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By amending § 14141 to create a binding agreement with 
community stakeholder groups, the government can do more than 
create temporary improvements.  Instead, it can change the status 
quo from one where civilians may be murdered while exiting a car 
and police persons on duty may commit crimes against humanity, 
to one where police can serve in peace and citizens feel protected. 
 
